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Defining the Government's Duty Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act,' it estab-
lished a mechanism for judicial resolution of claims arising from
the negligence of employees of the United States government.2
Prior to passage of the Act, the defense of sovereign immunity al-
lowed the United States "exceptional freedom from legal responsi-
bility." 3 The only relief available against the government for per-
sonal injury or property damage was through passage of a private
relief bill in Congress.4 With the advent of the Act, however, the
United States consented to a partial waiver5 of this broad immu-
1. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See generally 1 L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs (1979);
Pitard, Procedural Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 21 Loy. L. REv. 899 (1975).
3. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939).
4. The injured plaintiff could also institute a civil suit against the negligent employee,
but recovery often would be hindered by jurisdictional problems or by the employee's lack of
financial resources. See L. JAYSON, supra note 2, at § 178.03.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) excludes the following types of claims from the coverage of
the Act:
(1) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(2) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage or negligent transmission of let-
ters or postal matter.
(3) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or cus-
toms duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or
excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(4) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title
46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(5) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(6) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quar-
antine by the United States.
(7) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, ma-
licious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or inter-
ference with contract rights.
(8) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by
the regulation of the monetary system.
(9) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(10) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
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nity in circumstances that would have rendered a private person
liable.
The Act gives district courts jurisdiction to award damages
against the United States only when a private individual could be
held liable in like circumstances under state law.7 Although it has
received little critical commentary, application of this "analogous
private liability" test has not been completely uniform. Inconsis-
tency has resulted in the provision's application to situations in
which the government undertakes so-called "good samaritan" ac-
tivities such as inspection and certification pursuant to federal
statutes and regulations. Decisions in this area often hinge on
whether a court finds an actionable duty owed to injured plaintiffs
by the United States as a result of these governmental
undertakings .8
(11) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(12) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(13) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal inter-
mediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
6. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court stated that the reason for
the enactment of the Act was that "[t]he volume of private bills, the inadequacy of congres-
sional machinery for determination of facts, the importunities to which claimants subjected
members of Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong demand that claims for tort
wrongs be submitted to adjudiciation." Id. at 140.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) gives district courts jurisdiction to entertain actions for
damages arising out of
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), which states in part: "The United States shall be liable,
[with respect to the Act] in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances."
8. Although this Recent Development focuses solely on defining the duty owed to
plaintiffs injured by the negligence of government employees during inspections and certifi-
cation procedures, a plaintiff must ordinarily satisfy four elements to recover under a negli-
gence theory: first, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff; second, there must have been
a breach of that duty; third, the breach must be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury;
and last, the governmental defendant must not be exempt from suit under the discretionary
function exception of the Tort Claims Act.
The last element, the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), has
been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., Matthews, Federal Tort Claims Act-The
Proper Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception, 6 AM. U.L. REv. 22 (1957); Reynolds,
The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81
(1968); Zillman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 76 Mn.. L. REV. 1 (1976). In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the
Supreme Court's only extended discussion of the exception, the Court attempted to set
broad guidelines for distinguishing discretionary from nondiscretionary acts by stating that
[t]he 'discretionary function or duty' . . . includes more than the initiation of program
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Although plaintiffs traditionally have had great difficulty re-
covering under the Act for the negligent actions of government em-
ployees who undertake inspections and certifications,9 recent cases
reveal a greater judicial willingness to subject the United States to
liability under such circumstances.10 Indeed, several cases have
held that the existence of such regulatory activities gives rise to an
automatic federal statutory duty, breach of which results in negli-
gence per se under applicable state law."
This Recent Development traces the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the analogous private liability test and examines the re-
cent cases applying this test. The Recent Development then ana-
lyzes the divergent approaches taken in these cases and attempts
to determine when an actionable duty arises under the Act.
I1. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANALOGOUS PRIVATE
LIABLITY TEST
In the first case to construe the analogous private liability test
under the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Court, in Feres v. United
States,'" narrowly limited the cases in which the United States
would be subject to liability. The Court held that the government
was not liable for injuries to servicemen arising out of activities
incident to military service. The Court stated that since no Ameri-
can law had ever permitted a soldier to recover for negligence,
there could exist no analogous private liability that would justify
recovery under the Act. 3 The Court noted that rather than create
new causes of action, the Act simply recognized the liability of the
United States in circumstances that would result in private liabil-
and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for
policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of sub-
ordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official direc-
tions cannot be actionable.
Id. at 35.36. Although such broad language would seem to make the exception applicable to
a wide variety of governmental undertakings, courts generally have not been willing to util-
ize it when the government undertakes activities such as inspection and certification. For
example, in Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court rejected
the government's argument that all regulatory actions are discretionary functions. Instead, it
remarked that while the negligent formulation of enforcement policy is protected by the
discretionary function exception, the negligent execution of such policy is not. Id. at 1179
n.28.
9. See notes 42-56 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 58-77 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text.
12. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
13. Id. at 141.
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ity. 14 According to the Court, the Act, while waiving immunity
from recognized causes of action, was not intended to subject the
government to "novel and unprecedented liabilities.""5
In Dalehite v. United States"5 the Court continued to employ a
narrow approach in its interpretation of the Act's liability test. In
denying recovery, the Court first restated the proposition that the
Act does not create new causes of action. Then, noting that the
alleged carelessness of public firemen does not create private ac-
tionable rights,17 the Court held that the government was not liable
for negligent firefighting.1 8 The Court partially based its decision on
the fact that under state law such actions are protected by munici-
pal immunity, concluding that no action could lie against the
United States for negligence in the performance of an activity that
has no analogy in general tort law. 9
Dalehite's holding was sharply limited in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States.2" Indian Towing was an action for damages sus-
tained when a vessel went aground and cargo on a barge towed by
the vessel was damaged allegedly because of negligent operation of
a Coast Guard lighthouse." The Court held the government liable
based on the "good samaritan" doctrine, stating that "one who
14. Id.
15. Id. at 142.
16. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Dalehite is referred to as the Texas City Disaster case in which
560 persons were killed and much of a Texas city was destroyed because of an explosion and
fire occurring on a ship carrying sulphur and fertilizer at the order of the Office of War
Mobilization and Reconstruction.
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 44. The Court also refused to apply a doctrine of absolute liability because
the Tort Claims Act requires either a "negligent" or a "wrongful act," while the doctrine of
absolute liability arises irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself. Id. See also
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
20. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
21. Id. Coast Guard maintenance of lighthouses is authorized by 14 U.S.C. § 81 (1976).
22. 350 U.S. at 64. States that have adopted the "good samaritan" doctrine generally
rely on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965), which contains the following
language:
§ 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
§ 324A. Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Performance of Undertaking
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things,
is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to
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undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reli-
ance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful man-
ner."2 3 The Court also noted that the statutory language of section
26742 subjected the government to liability to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, not under the same
circumstances.2 Correspondingly, it rejected the government's ar-
gument that there could be no liability for "uniquely governmental
functions."26
The Indian Towing Court further noted that the government's
liability must be determined by standards applicable to private
persons, not by those applied to municipalities or other public bod-
ies.Y To do otherwise, it declared, would force the courts to con-
sider "the 'non-governmental'-'governmental' quagmire that has
long plagued the law of municipal corporations." 2 Thus, the Court
rejected the suggestion of Dalehite that actions protected by mu-
nicipal immunity could have no private analogy in general tort
law. 2'
In a case often read in conjunction with Indian Towing, the
Supreme Court in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States3 reemphasized
that the test to measure the government's liability under the Tort
Claims Act is that of a private person under like circumstances,
not that of a municipal corporation or other public body.3 1
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon
the undertaking.
23. 350 U.S. at 64-65.
24. See note 7 supra.
25. 350 U.S. at 64.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 65.
28. Id.
29. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Indian Towing represents the most sig-
nificant Supreme Court decision concerning governmental undertaking of good samaritan
activities, but it was decided by only a 5-4 vote. The dissent argued that the majority was
wrong in not applying the principles of Feres and Dalehite to the factual setting of the case.
It noted that
[t]he catastrophe that gave rise to the Dalehite case was subsequently presented to
Congress for legislative relief by way of compensation for the losses which resulted . . .
from the negligence of the Coast Guard. Throughout the reports, discussion and enact-
ment of the relief act, there was no effort to modify the Tort Claims Act so as to change
the law, in any respect, as interpreted by this Court in Feres and Dalehite.
350 U.S. at 74 (Reed, J., dissenting).
30. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
31. Id. at 319. "To the extent that there was anything to the contrary in the Dalehite
case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing." Id.
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Rayonier involved the alleged negligence of the United States For-
est Service in fighting a forest fire.2 The Court held that the
United States would be liable for losses sustained if state law
would impose liability on a private person under similar circum-
stances.3 Although noting that it might be "novel and unprece-
dented" to hold the United States liable for negligence in this situ-
ation, the Court, with language that stands in stark contrast to its
earlier language in Feres and Dalehite, declared that "the very pur-
pose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's tradi-
tional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to estab-
lish novel and unprecedented governmental liability.','3
A 1963 Supreme Court case, United States v. Muniz,35 al-
though not specifically concerned with governmental undertakings,
contains language that possesses potential for confusion in inter-
preting the analogous private liability test. In Muniz, the Court
held that federal prisoners could maintain suit under the Tort
Claims Act for injuries sustained through the negligence of govern-
ment employees. In so holding, the Court noted that several states
allowed prisoners to recover in like circumstances against both the
jailer and the state. 6 The Court recognized, however, that in sev-
eral states jailers are not liable to prisoners because of such de-
fenses as quasi-judicial immunity37 and lack of duty owed.38 The
Court nevertheless stated that "the duty of care owed by the Bu-
reau of Prisons to federal prisoners is fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042,
independent of an inconsistent state rule.""
The effect of Muniz on the analogous private liability test of
the Tort Claims Act is unclear. On the one hand, Muniz could be
32. The Forest Service had entered into an agreement with the state of Washington to
protect against and to suppress any fires in certain areas of land. See 16 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
33. 352 U.S. at 318.
34. Id.
35. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
36. Id. at 159-60.
37. Bush v. Babb, 23 Ill. App. 2d 285, 162 N.E.2d 594 (1959); Carder v. Steiner, 225
Md. 271, 170 A.2d 220 (1961).
38. O'Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N.E. 371 (1894).
39. 374 U.S. at 164-65. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1976) provides:
The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall-
(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and cor-
rectional institutions;
(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsis-
tence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or
held as witnesses or otherwise;
(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged
with or convicted of offenses against the United States.
[Vol. 33:795
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interpreted as holding that a duty to use due care may arise auto-
matically from a federal statute regardless of how a state would
treat a private person in similar circumstances. On the other hand,
Muniz may be viewed as requiring courts to look first at general
negligence or malpractice principles to establish a duty and then to
modify such principles to find liability despite contrary state rules
such as municipal immunity. 0 Of course, any interpretation of
Muniz must be tempered by the fact that its holding may be lim-
ited to its specific factual setting. On numerous occasions, however,
lower federal courts have relied on Muniz for support under many
different factual situations.41
Thus, whatever the full import of Muniz, the Supreme Court
has rendered a fairly expansive reading to the analogous private
liability test of the Tort Claims Act. Specifically, Indian Towing
and Rayonier indicate that such a broad approach is particularly
applicable when the government undertakes activities authorized
by a statutory or regulatory framework. Despite the Court's deci-
sions, however, lower federal courts have been inconsistent in both
the results reached and the analyses employed when considering
the liability of the United States under the Act.
III. DIVERGENT APPROACHES OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Narrow Approach
Numerous lower court decisions have adopted the view that no
claim or cause of action exists against the government for negligent
performance of activities conducted in conjunction with federally
authorized inspections and certifications. These opinions stress
that when the government is not contractually obligated to perform
such undertakings, it cannot be said to owe a duty to private plain-
tiffs to assure that these activities are not negligently performed.
For example, in Davis v. United States42 the court denied recovery
for the alleged negligence of an OSHA 3 inspection officer. The
court held that the duties of the United States are rooted in federal
law and that nothing resembling those duties devolves on private
40. See L. JAYSON, supra note 2, at § 160; The Supreme Court: 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L.
Rlv. 62, 134-36 (1963).
41. See, e.g., Black v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Smith v.
United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir. 1976); Quinionez v. United States, 526 F.2d 799,
800 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); McClain v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 770 (D. Or. 1978);
Lahren v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.D. 1977).
42. 395 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
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persons under OSHA.44 Application of the Tort Claims Act to the
enforcement activity of OSHA officers, the court declared, would
equate duty under state law with duty under federal law contrary
to the intention of the Act.45
The Davis court noted that applicable state law placed a duty
only on persons who own or are in control of property to take suita-
ble precautions to avoid injuries to others." For this reason, the
court concluded that Indian Towing47 and Rayonier" were inappo-
site to cases involving OSHA inspections." Thus, it concluded that
the government could not be held liable for negligent inspection
when the undertaking was required by federal law."
The analysis employed in Davis has not been restricted to
claims stemming from negligent OSHA inspections. In Mosley v.
United States" the court held that injuries suffered by an employee
on the premises of a mining operation periodically inspected by
government employees were not recoverable under the Tort Claims
Act.12 According to the court, the inspection provisions of the fed-
eral Mine Safety Act53 did not impose any duty under state law on
a private person acting under similar circumstances.5 ' The court
also noted that the purpose behind the Mine Safety Act was to
ensure an extension of federal mine supervision, not to create a pri-
vate cause of action for negligent violation of the statute.5 There-
fore, it concluded that suit could not be maintained against the
United States because such conduct did not create .an actionable
duty.56
B. The Intermediate Approach
Although Davis and Mosley are indicative of a judicial unwill-
44. 395 F. Supp. at 795.
45. Id. at 797.
46. Id. at 796 (citing McDonnell v. Wasenmiller, 74 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1934); Colvin v.
Powell & Co., 163 Neb. 112, 77 N.W.2d 900 (1956); Hickman v. Parks Const. Co., 162 Neb.
461, 76 N.W.2d 403 (1956)).
47. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
49. 395 F. Supp. at 796-97.
50. Id. at 797.
51. 456 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
52. In this action, plaintiff sued for wrongful death after her husband, a crusher opera-
tor, had been killed on the work premises due to improperly guarded and inadequately
equipped machinery.
53. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-740 (1976).
54. 456 F. Supp. at 674.
55. Id. at 673.
56. Id. at 674.
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ingness to subject the United States to liability for negligent per-
formance of federally authorized inspections, 57 several cases have
cast doubt on the continued vitality of such reasoning. These deci-
sions, although not always differing in result from the narrow ap-
proach, utilize an analysis that focuses not on the reason for under-
taking inspections, but on the question of whether a duty arose
under a state's good samaritan rule because of the relationship cre-
ated. These courts have held that individuals injured because of
negligent government inspection and certification procedures are
not precluded from recovery under the Tort Claims Act.
A series of recent cases typifies this emerging approach. In
Blessing v. United States58 the court stated that although the Tort
Claims Act was not designed to redress breaches of federal statu-
tory duty, negligent performance of such undertakings may give
rise to a claim under the Act in circumstances in which negligent
breach of a duty is predicated on state, not federal law." In Bless-
ing, injured employees brought suit under the Act alleging negli-
gent inspection of an employer's premises by OSHA. The court
found that plaintiffs failed to allege the necessary elements of in-
creased risk of harm or reasonable reliance under the state's good
samaritan law to allow the case to proceed to trial." Nevertheless,
the court decided that it had tentative jurisdiction under the Act
and allowed plaintiffs sixty days to develop evidence that might
enable them to state a cause of action. Thus, the full import of
the court's decision is that the government may be held liable for
negligent inspections when such elements are satisfied. Corre-
spondingly, Blessing does not search for a private right of action
under OSHA, 2 but instead asks whether a duty arose under state
law because of the relationship created by the undertaking."3
United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States,"4 the most re-
cent circuit court decision in this area, applied the Blessing analy-
sis in the context of negligent inspections of aircraft by the Federal
Aviation Administration." The court noted that under the Tort
57. See also Mercer v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Mudlo v.
United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
58. 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
59. Id. at 1186 n.37.
60. Id. at 1196-99.
61. Id. at 1200.
62. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
63. 447 F. Supp. at 1166, 1186-87.
64. 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. United Scottish Ins. Co. dealt with improper installation of gasoline-fueled heaters
in an aircraft that subsequently crashed. FAA regulations required the installing company to
1980]
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Claims Act courts must determine governmental liability by anal-
ogy to liability of a private person in "like circumstances" under
state law." According to the court, inspections made pursuant to a
federal statutory duty are not automatically included or excluded
from the ambit of the Act." Instead, the Ninth Circuit focused on
the relationship of the parties created by the undertaking to deter-
mine whether a duty arose under the state's good samaritan doc-
trine to perform the inspection and certification in a careful
manner.
8
The Scottish Insurance court found the Supreme Court's good
samaritan analysis in Indian Towing" to be directly applicable to
situations in which the government negligently inspects and certi-
fies others' property." Unlike the court in Davis v. United States,7
the Ninth Circuit did not find ownership or control of property rel-
evant. Further, it did not consider the purpose of the inspection
important.72 Instead, the court focused solely on the elements of the
good samaritan doctrine to determine the existence of an actiona-
ble duty in all types of governmental undertakings."
Thus, Blessing and Scottish Insurance first ask whether an ac-
tionable duty can be found under state law and only then allow
any federal regulation to be introduced as relevant evidence of
whether that duty has been negligently breached.74 Similarly, Cle-
mente v. United States15 also recognizes such a prerequisite inquiry
when determining claims under the Act.7 Clemente, however,
seems to suggest that a court might more readily infer an actiona-
ble duty when an underlying statutory duty also exists.77 To the
acquire a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for this type of installation. The FAA was
required to inspect the installation prior to approval of issuance of the STC. See 14 C.F.R. §
21.111 (1979). The FAA issued the STC, and the airplane later crashed as a proximate result
of an in-flight fire caused by improper installation. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United
States, 614 F.2d at 190.
66. 614 F.2d at 192.
67. Id. at 193-94.
68. Id. at 194.
69. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
70. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 194.
71. See notes 42-50 supra and accompanying text.
72. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 193.
73. Id. at 193-95. See also Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979);
George Byers Sons, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 135 (D. Md. 1979).
74. See United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 197 n.9.
75. 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
76. Id. at 1143. Clemente also involved allegations that the FAA negligently inspected
an aircraft that subsequently crashed.
77. Id. at 1150.
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extent that the Clemente analysis focuses on the purposes for the
inspection, it represents a modification of the Blessing and Scottish
Insurance approach.
C. The Broad Approach
In contrast to both the narrow and intermediate approaches, a
number of decisions have taken a broad view and have found gov-
ernmental liability without considering state law beyond applying
negligence per se tort doctrine. These opinions stress that existence
of a federal statute or regulation implementing government activity
can, by itself, create a governmental duty for purposes of recovery
under the Tort Claims Act.78 For example, in Betesh v. United
States7 the court held that a federal regulation directing Selective
Service examining physicians to advise rejected examinees con-
cerning the need for private medical attention could serve as the
sole basis for finding an actionable duty. 0 The court noted that
under applicable state law, "a Federal regulation presumptively es-
tablishes a standard of care" and "establishes a presumption of a
breach of a duty."'" It then rejected the government's argument
that no analogous private liability could exist because no private
individuals were subject to the regulation. First, it noted that the
"like circumstances" limitation on governmental liability does not
require similarity in every aspect of a cause of action. 2 Second, the
court stated that in order to impose an actionable duty it could
properly take into consideration those aspects unique to govern-
mental functions, such as governmental regulations.8 3 To interpret
the Act 'otherwise, the court concluded, would be contrary to its
plain language and its intent to expand governmental liability.84
Similarly, in Raymer v. United States,8 5 the court ruled that
the United States, through promulgation of the Mine Safety Act,88
assumed a duty to inspect and to regulate mining operations and
could be held liable for negligent breach of that statutory duty.87
78. See United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 197 n.9.
79. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974).
80. The court went on to show that applicable state law also could serve as a basis for
liability. The court, however, offered this conclusion as an alternative to the independent
holding that the federal regulations established a duty of care. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 243.
82. Id. at 244.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 455 F. Supp. 165 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
86. See note 53 supra.
87. Plaintiffs' decedents were killed when the vehicle in which they were riding over-
1980]
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The court reached this decision despite its acknowledgment that no
state law placed a similar duty on private persons."8 Instead, it con-
cluded that the federal government, by statutorily imposing a duty
to act in a safe manner, subjected itself to liability under the
state's general common law rule of tort.89 The court placed particu-
lar emphasis on what it perceived to be the purpose behind the
mining act and reasoned that Congress intended to impose upon
the government a nondelegable duty to supervise operation of the
nation's coal mines.90
IV. ANALYSIS
Inconsistency concerning interpretation of the Tort Claims
Act's liability test has developed in part because of competing pol-
icy considerations and in part because of the lack of a clearcut le-
gal definition of when an actionable duty arises. According to pro-
ponents of the broad interpretation of the Act's test, use of a state's
negligence per se rule for violation of statutes and regulations satis-
fies the requirement that courts must look to state law to deter-
mine private liability under similar circumstances.' Courts utiliz-
ing such an approach point to a number of public policy
considerations to support this view. For example, if Congress in-
tended to protect a class of persons or the public in general with a
particular safety measure, then imposition of a statutory duty
would fulfill this congressional purpose. 2 Further, the government
would have a positive incentive to reduce injuries by careful moni-
toring if it knew it would be subject to liability for negligent in-
spections. 3 Also, governmental liability would guarantee the in-
jured plaintiff a solvent defendant in situations in which recovery
against private persons is impractical or is precluded 4
turned. Plaintiffs alleged that the vehicle and the roadway on which the accident occurred
failed to meet federal safety standards and that the United States did not require compli-
ance with these standards. 455 F. Supp. at 166.
88. Id. at 167.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (con-
sidering various possible bases of liability, including justifiable reliance, and several duties
in federal law, but not discussing elements of state law or good samaritan doctrine directly).
91. See notes 78-88 supra and accompanying text.
92. See 455 F. Supp. at 167.
93. See Note, The Federal Seal of Approval: Government Liability for Negligent In-
spection, 62 GEo. L.J. 937, 960 (1974).
94. Id. For example, the negligent government employee may not be amenable to suit,
or workmen's compensation may provide an employee only partial recovery for job-related




Although these arguments are persuasive, this broad approach
to the scope of the Tort Claims Act is not warranted for several
reasons. First, equally strong policy considerations mitigate against
holding the government automatically liable for its employee's neg-
ligent actions. For example, to expand the relief available against
the United States could have an inhibiting effect on utilization of
authorized government safety programs. 5 Moreover, it may lead to
a lessening of the degree of care exercised by employers and prop-
erty owners subject to such inspections. Further, as several courts
have pointed out, the expanded role of the federal government in
the safety area does not necessarily indicate congressional intent to
make the United States a joint insurer of all activity subject to
safety inspections."
The application of per se liability to breach of federal statutory
duties also appears unjustified based on a close reading of the Su-
preme Court's development of the Act's liability test. In the area of
governmental undertakings, Indian Towing and Rayonier provide
specific support for the proposition that a more substantial nexus
with state law than negligence per se theory must be found when
considering the interrelationship of federal statutes and regulations
with state law. 7 Even if these cases were distinguishable on the
ground that they involved contractual undertakings and govern-
mental control of property, logic would dictate that the Court be
even more hesitant to impose an actionable duty on the United
States absent such factors.
The only Supreme Court case that possibly justifies such a
broad interpretation of the Act is United States v. Muniz. In
Muniz, an action brought by federal prisoners, the Court held inap-
posite a state statute granting a jailer the defense of lack of duty,
declaring that a federal duty is fixed by federal statute regardless
of inconsistent state law.'8 Muniz, however, has not been relied
upon as authority by lower federal courts for the proposition that
violation of federal statutes automatically provides an actionable
duty for faulty safety inspections. In addition, the Muniz Court
had already found that appropriate state negligence law could be
applied to the prisoners' claims." Finally, it seems that if the Court
95. If the government chose not to conduct inspections at all, it would probably be
protected from liability by the discretionary function exception. See note 8 supra.
96. E.g., 567 F.2d at 107.
97. See notes 20-34 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 160-61.
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had meant to modify the approaches utilized in Indian Towing and
Rayonier, it would have discussed these cases in Muniz or in subse-
quent decisions. For these reasons, Muniz' potential reach should
be limited absent greater clarity and direction from the Court.
Nevertheless, the Court's language in Muniz may be helpful in
understanding the rationale behind the limited number of cases es-
pousing a broad approach. For example, in Raymer the court
pointed to the pervasiveness of the regulations concerning opera-
tion of the nation's mines and concluded that the United States
was charged with the inescapable responsibility of monitoring the
mines.100 Similarly, in Muniz the federal statute provided specific
statutory duties concerning the protection and care of federal pris-
oners. 01 In this regard, certain governmental undertakings may be
considered "exceptional" and may therefore justify application of a
rule of automatic liability when congressional intent clearly indi-
cates establishment of a nondelegable duty. 102 The problem with
developing such an approach, however, is that in many instances
congressional intent is not always readily ascertainable from an
act's language or its legislative history.0 3 Thus, courts could easily
reach different results if they tried to apply an exception to a gen-
eral rule of nonliability based upon congressional intent.
Rejection of broad application of the Act's liability test, how-
ever, does not result in an immediate solution to the confusion sur-
rounding interpretation of the Act. Although courts utilizing the
narrow and intermediate approaches basically agree that the gov-
ernment should not become a joint insurer through performance of
safety inspections, they differ in their consideration of state law
pursuant to the mandate of the Act. Cases utilizing the narrow,
100. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 39 supra.
102. In an analogous situation, the district court in Marshall v. Donofrio, 465 F. Supp.
838 (E.D. Pa. 1978), held that warrantless inspections of mining operations were constitu-
tional despite the Supreme Court's holding in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978),
that warrantless inspections under OSHA were invalid. The court based its ruling on the
"closely regulated industry exception" articulated by the Court in Barlow's. It cited the
lengthy history of pervasive regulations in the industry, and it noted that the coal mine law,
unlike OSHA, applies to a single industry that serves urgent federal interests. 465 F. Supp.
at 841-42.
103. For example, OSHA's purpose clause states that the aim of Congress in enacting
the statute was "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 29 U.S.C. §
651(b) (1976). By contrast, the Act's general duty clause places upon the employer the obli-
gation to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees." Id. § 654(a)(1).
[Vol. 33:795
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
traditional approach justify denial of claims by stating that federal
inspection statutes simply institute voluntary inspections of non-
governmental projects or that the statutes place no corresponding
duty on private persons to implement or enforce inspections.104 The
result, in effect, is to bar application of the Tort Claims Act to
enforcement activities of federal inspection agencies.' 5 On the
other hand, courts utilizing the developing intermediate approach
search for an analogous duty owed under state law independent of
the language of the federal inspection statute. If state law would
place a duty on private persons operating under similar circum-
stances, these courts also would impose an actionable duty on the
United States.'"
Of these two analytical frameworks, the intermediate approach
best approximates the spirit and tone of the Supreme Court's ex-
pansive reading of the Act's liability test. Specifically, Indian Tow-
ing seems to be direct authority for the proposition that govern-
mental liability may arise when the good samaritan doctrine is
applicable and there has been reliance to the claimant's detri-
ment.' 7 Admittedly, Indian Towing involved a government project
in which the government stood in the position of owner or possessor
of property. This distinction, however, is not central to an interpre-
tation of the Act. Instead, the key inquiry should be whether appli-
cable state law requires such control or possession before a private
person undertaking a similar function would be held subject to lia-
bility. In this regard, courts adopting the intermediate approach
are correct in asserting that the crucial inquiry is whether the rela-
tionship created by the undertaking creates an actionable duty
under state law.' 8
Although this intermediate approach is for the most part ana-
lytically sound, its utilization could have a significant impact on
litigation of claims involving negligent governmental undertakings.
First, depending on a state's good samaritan rule, a great expan-
sion of governmental liability could result. For example, several
federal inspection statutes provide for employee input, allowing
them to request and participate in inspections.' 9 Evidence that
such procedures were invoked could justify a holding that the em-
104. See notes 42-56 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Mudlo v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
106. See notes 58-77 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text. See also L. JAYSON, supra note 2, at§ 83.
108. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 194.
109. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1)-(2) (1976).
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ployee relied on the subsequent inspection as assurance of a safe
work site."10 Similarly, an actionable duty could arise under the
theory that the government undertook to perform a duty already
owed to the employee by the employer."' Besides this potential in-
crease in allowable claims, a second obvious effect is lack of uni-
formity in application of the Tort Claims Act, since liability hinges
on whether and to what extent the forum state has adopted a good
samaritan rule. This approach could also lead to a limited amount
of forum shopping, since the Act allows suit to be brought either
where the injured claimant resides or where the act or omission
complained of occurred."'
Although the intermediate approach most effectively imple-
ments the purpose of the Act, courts should resist using it as a
vehicle to expand liability beyond warranted situations. In part,
this approach operates as a buffer between competing policy inter-
ests underlying the narrow and broad interpretations of the Act's
liability test. Thus, devices may be available for courts to accom-
modate these interests while still operating within the confines of a
definite analytical framework. For example, although congressional
intent should not govern actionability under the Act, the inclusion
or omission of specific orders or precise standards in a statute may
bear upon a claim of justifiable reliance for purposes of meeting a
state's good samaritan doctrine."3 Moreover, courts may be less
willing to impose an actionable duty on the United States when
circumstances indicate that an employer or owner of property is in
a unique position to afford protection to his employees or third par-
ties. Outside of such limited circumstances, however, any substan-
tive modifications of the analytical framework should come only
through legislative change.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal government presently conducts activities such as
testing, inspection, and certification with ever-increasing fre-
quency."' Inevitably, some of these undertakings are performed
negligently, and unsafe conditions are allowed to remain in exis-
tence. Lower federal courts, in responding to claims of persons
injured due to such conditions, have taken divergent approaches
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 323 (1965).
111. See id. § 324A.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1976).
113. See United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d at 194 n.4.
114. See Note, supra note 93, at 937.
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toward defining the duty owed by the government to these
claimants. The court's inquiry generally focuses on the language
of the Act's liability test, relevant Supreme Court interpretations
of that test, and competing policy interests. Despite some short-
comings, the intermediate approach discussed in a series of recent
cases provides a workable analysis consistent with the tone and
spirit of the Court's expansive reading of the test. Moreover,
this approach allows for an accommodation of the competing
policy considerations while still operating within the confines of
a definite analytical framework. For these reasons, its use should
be continued by courts attempting to determine when an action-
able duty arises under the Torts Claims Act.
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